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STATEMENT OF" JURISDICTION
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Sec.

o

"JL~:* ^^J.^

nn.

78-2-2(3) _
: STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The State agrees with the statement of issues presented

and standards ol review found ir? ar>r>ellant's brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Utah Department
concurs with the statement
except as noted:

Transportation
IM C M S H

as n

generally
-

•:<»>.1 lance,

A.

Nature of the Case

The assertion of Reliance to the effect that UDOT's
liquidated damage provision does not provide for a reduction
based on substantial completion and that whether the project is
.9 or 99.9 per cent complete makes no difference in the daily
charge of $600 is true but irrelevant.

The intent of the

contract was that the work be completed by a date certain and it
does not contemplate "substantial completion" or a reduction in
the daily liquidated damage amount.

Liquidated damages are

provided to compensate for increased overhead and unless the
project is complete certain costs are incurred regardless of the
stage of completion.

In this case UDOT's actual damages or

increased overhead approximately equals the liquidated damages
assessed so there is no reason to reduce the daily charge.
Young's statement concerning the fact that Young defaulted
on several other projects and that Reliance paid out over
$2,000,000 may be true when all of Young's projects are
considered but not as a result of this project.

Documented

evidence in this case shows that Young made over $1,000,000
profit on this project (Exhibit 91).
UDOT does not agree that it is correct to characterize
this suit as a breach of contract action.

The trial court agreed

with UDOT that the contract should be enforced as written. There
is no breach of contract.
B.

Proceedings and Disposition by Trial Court

The case was tried to the court on March 26-29, 1991.
2

Reliance sought a recovery of $94,800 withheld by UDOT based on
the contract provision which specified that all work was to be
completed by November 27, 1985 (said date includes a 43-day time
allowance for delay caused by UDOT conceded during contract
performance) and that for every day after said date that the work
remained incomplete that Young was to be assessed $600.00 to
cover UDOT's increased overhead.

UDOT conceded at trial that its

calculation of liquidated damages was in error by two days and
admitted that it owed Reliance $1200.00. The correct calculation
is computed by deducting 42 days from the 198-day period between
November 28, 1985 and June 13, 1986, the date the project was
accepted as complete.

The 42 days is a concession granted after

the project was complete.

For purposes of calculation UDOT

stipulated at trial that the original completion date of October
15, 1985 was continued 85 days (43 days for delay caused by UDOT
and 42 days granted by UDOT as "good faith") which would have
moved the date to January 8, 1986. UDOT argued that its actual
damages incurred for engineering and administrative costs totaled
in excess of $82,000 and that this sum reasonably relates to the
amount assessed as liquidated damages.

The court agreed with

UDOT and sustained the assessment of liquidated damages as
reduced at trial by $1200.00 which said sum was awarded to
Reliance.

The court agreed that under the language of the

provisions relating to completion date contracts that the
doctrine of substantial completion does not apply to the facts of
this case.

3

C.

Designation of the Parties

The PLAINTIFF and APPELLANT is Reliance Insurance Company
and is referred to hereafter as Reliance.

Reliance is surety for

L.A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and became the assignee to
Young prior to the completion of the project in 1986.
L.A. YOUNG SONS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY was the contractor
and by reason of its assignment to Reliance is not a party to
this action or appeal, and is referred to hereafter as Young.
The UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION is the DEFENDANT and
APPELLEE, and is the owner of the project and is referred to
hereafter as UDOT.
The FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION administers federal aid
funding.

While not a party to the contract they are often

involved behind the scene in decisions related to contract
performance and funding.

They are referred to hereafter as FHWA.

The project is situated on Interstate 80 between Black
Rock and Old Saltair in Salt Lake County and is a federal aid
project designated as IR-80-3(95)102 and is referred to hereafter
as "the project".
STATEMENT OF FACTS
UDOT considers the Statement of the Facts contained in the
Appellants' brief to be slanted in some instances in favor of
Reliance's theory of the case and inadequate for the purpose of
its brief and theory on appeal and therefore submits the
following:
1.

Section 108.06 of the Standard Specifications
4

applicable to the contract as amended, in pertinent part reads as
follows:
"The number of days allowed for completion of the
work included in the contract will be stated in the
proposal and contract, and will be known as the
"contract time".
When the contract completion time is a fixed
calendar date, it shall be the date on which all
work on the project shall be completed.
Suspension of work on some, but not all items, as
ordered by the engineer, shall be considered
partial suspension. Partial suspension may apply
to working day or calendar day contracts.
When final acceptance has been duly made by the
Engineer as prescribed in Subsection 105.16, the
daily time charge will cease". (Emphasis supplied.)
(Exhibit 4.)
2.

Section 108.07 of the Standard Specifications

specifies how "contract time" may be increased.

For completion

date contracts it specifies that additional time shall be added
in calendar days.

It also states that:

"If the Engineer finds that work was delayed
because of conditions beyond the control and
without the fault of the contractor" that time may
be extended "in such amount as the conditions
justify". (Emphasis supplied.) (Exhibit 4.)
3.

Section 108.08 of the Standard Specifications in

pertinent part reads as follows:
"For each calendar day . . . after a specified
completion date that any work shall remain
uncompleted after the contract time specified for
the completion of the work provided for in the
contract, the sum specified below will be deducted
from any money due the contractor, not as a
penalty, but as liquidated damages for Department's
increased overhead: provided, however, that due
account shall be taken of any adjustment of the
contract time for completion of the work granted
5

under the provisions of subsection 108.07.
The Department may waive such portions of the
liquidated damages as may accrue after the work is
in condition for safe and convenient use by the
traveling public." (The table showing the daily
time charges based on the total dollar amount of
the contract follows but is omitted here. The
daily charge applicable to this contract is $600.00
per day as provided in the amended table set forth
in Addendum number 2.) (Emphasis supplied.)
(Exhibit 4.)
4.

Early in the project it was discovered that a

materials site which Young was using and which had been provided
by UDOT was not properly cleared for use and UDOT paid Young by
supplemental agreement to relocate into another site.

The time

between cessation of operations in the first site and the
resumption of operations in the second site amounted to 43 days.
This time delay is considered beyond the control and without the
fault of Young

(exhibits 47 & 62).

5. The work of paving the main lines of 1-80 was completed
October 17, 1985, Young continued other work on the contract
until January 13, 1986 when all signs were in place, then
suspended work due to winter conditions.

No work occured during

the period between January 14, 1986 and February 24, 1986
(exhibit 84).
6.

UDOT personnel continued to monitor the project on a

daily basis as well as to perform work related to final
accounting for pay quantities during the winter months of January
and February 1986 (tr. 382-386).
7. Several items of work remained uncompleted on February
24,1986 with the primary one being the placement and spreading of

6

topsoil.

When operations resumed they continued until June 13,

1986 when the project was accepted by UDOT. A final inspection
was conducted on July 21, 1986 and a "punch list" of uncompleted
items was issued.

The "punch list" items were not completed

until September 21, 1986 (exhibit 54).
8.

Young requested time extensions or a waiver of

liquidated damages for various reasons by their letters of 25
October 1985 and 14 November 1985 (exhibits 39 & 41).
9. UDOT's Engineer, John Nye, granted Young's request to
the extent of a 43 day extension for the materials site problem.
His letter dated April 15, 1986 gives reasons for his denial of
any further time extension (exhibit 47).
10.

Young by letter dated July 25, 1986 requested an

additional time extension and explained troubles encountered with
placement of topsoil (exhibit 55).
11.

On July 9, 1986 the topsoil sub-contractor, Sunbird,

wrote to Young and stated its reasons why it had not completed
the work earlier (exhibit 52).

Said letter states that Sunbird

was prepared to begin work in August 1985 but that Young delayed
the start of their work until October 14, 1985.
12.

UDOT's engineer, John Nye, transmitted Young's letter

of July 25, 1986 to Bert Taylor, UDOT's Chief Construction
Engineer and outlined reasons why he felt some consideration
should be given to Young (exhibit 56).
13.

On or about October 15, 1986, UDOT's engineer, John

Nye met with Richard Laubsch of the Federal Highway
7

Administration (FHWA) and reviewed Young's performance of the
work for the purpose of securing some concession in the charging
of time.

FHWA is the agency which controls federal aid funding.

It was agreed that FHWA would concur in a 42 day time extension
which coincides with the period in January and February of 1986
when no work occurred (exhibit 82).
14.

Thereafter supplemental agreement number 12 was

prepared which included the 43 day extension for the materials
site problem which was the fault of UDOT and the additional 42
day extension which FHWA agreed it would concur in for a total of
85 days (exhibit 57).
15.

The 85-day extension effectively moved the completion

date for the purpose of calculating the delay period to January
8# 1986. The number of calendar days between January 9, 1986 and
June 13, 1986 totals 156 days and became the basis for the
liquidated damages assessed.
the time as 158 days.

John Nye had erroneously calculated

At trial UDOT conceded that it owed

Reliance for two days at $600.00 per day for a total of $1200.00.
The total amount of liquidated damages based on 156 days is
$93,600 (exhibit 84).
16.

UDOT incurred expenses during December 1985 and from

January 1, 1986 through June 1986 totalling $82,631.16 (exhibits
64 & 65).

Said charges were billed to FHWA and UDOT received

federal aid reimbursement.
17.

Bert Taylor, UDOT's Chief Construction Engineer sent

a memorandum to the Division Administrator for FHWA dated

8

December 4, 1986 and requested some leeway in the charging of
liquidated damages in certain conditions. Attached to his
memorandum was a letter from counsel for Reliance which sought
relief from the charging of liquidated damages (exhibit 59) . At
trial Taylor explained his motivation in sending the letter and
the fact that FHWA disagreed with the granting of such
concessions as being unfair to other bidders (Taylor testimony at
Tr. 167-170).
18.

UDOT incurred costs totaling $36,895.65 after it

terminated the charging of liquidated damages on June 13, 1986
until September 1986 when Reliance finally completed work on the
punch list items (exhibit 64).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
UDOT assessed a total of $93,600.00 in liquidated damages.
UDOT's actual engineering related overhead during the period of
time that the liquidated damages were assessed totaled
$82,631.16.

An added amount of $36,895.65 was incurred after

time charges were suspended and prior to the completion of "punch
list" items. UDOT believes there is a reasonable relationship
between actual costs and the amount assessed.

The Court's

finding to that effect should be sustained.
The contract between the parties required all work to be
completed by a date certain, in this case, October 15, 1985.
UDOT granted 43 days of time prior to completion of the work for
delay it caused Young and granted an additional 42-day "good
faith" concession after completion of the work.
9

UDOT alleges that the doctrine of "substantial completion"
does not apply in this case because the contract requires that
the work be completed by a date certain and that the court
correctly ruled that it does not apply to the facts of this case.
Substantial completion and final completion are the same date in
a completion date contract.

Young's failure to complete

placement of topsoil until June, 1986 prevented the project from
being accepted as complete.
UDOT's ability to accurately account for its actual costs
does not insure that the parties can agree as to whether costs
are due to delay in completion or would be incurred in the wrapup of any project and for that reason as well as for the fact
that there are other indirect and unquantified costs which often
arise incidental to delay liquidated damages are appropriate.
ARGUMENT
I.

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES WERE APPROPRIATELY ASSESSED
A.

There is a Reasonable Relationship
Between the Actual Damages Incurred
by UDOT and the Amount Assessed.

The contract between Young and UDOT required that "all
work be completed by October 15, 1985".

The materials site

clearance error by UDOT delayed Young 43 days.

This effectively

extended the completion date to November 27, 1985. Young became
liable for liquidated damages after that date.

In fact, John Nye

responded to Young's request and granted the said 43-day
extension (exhibit 47).

The project was accepted as complete by

UDOT on June 13, 1986. During the period between the said dates,
10

the total of the engineering costs (overhead) charged to the
project was $82,631.16 (exhibits 64 & 65).
UDOT had a crew of approximately 18 people assigned during
1985 under the direction of John Nye (tr. 203). Nye and his crew
were responsible for two projects (tr. 371). Time charges by the
crew were made to the two separate projects.

Page 1 of Exhibit

64 is a summary of charges to the project totaling $17,601.37 for
one two week period in December 1985.1

Nye explained that the

salaries listed on exhibit 64 which total $3,735.51 actually
involve only 3 people (tr. 374-375).

It is obvious from this

evidence that UDOT's typical daily overhead charges substantially
exceeded an average of $1,000.00 per day at a time when the major
work items had been completed and only finish work was being
pursued.

The stipulated time charge of $600.00 per day is

certainly reasonable when compared to actual charges made during
this finish work period.

The daily average would no doubt have

been higher during the time when the major work effort was
underway.

In fact, Nye in a deposition stated that inspection

costs "on a daily basis was about $1600.00 per day." (Published
deposition dated July 7, 1988, p. 66) . Inspection is only one of
many activities that generated engineering charges (overhead) to
the project.

Other division within UDOT also charged expense to

the project on occasion as explained by Nye (tr. 191).

1

Testimony established that Young worked throughout the month
of December 1985. Nye's crew was on the project but their expenses
were not charged to the project for half the month of December.
(Tr. 253-255.)
11

Although not legally obligated to do so, UDOT after
consultation with FHWA following completion of the work granted
an additional concession of 42 days in the charging of time for a
period of time when no work occurred in January and February of
1986 (exhibit 82),

Both of the time extensions were combined

into a single supplemental agreement several months after all
work was complete (exhibit 57).

The total of the assessed

liquidated damages is $93,600,00. There is therefore a
reasonable relationship between the actual overhead costs
incurred by UDOT after November 27, 1985 and the liquidated
damages which UDOT assessed.
Utah law concerning liquidated damages is fairly well
settled as to the necessity of the relationship between the two
amounts.

Justice Zimmerman in a concurring opinion in the case

of Allen v. Kingdon. 723 P.2d 394 (Utah 1986) stated the
following:
". . . 1 believe this Court routinely applies the
alternative test of Warner -rwarner v. Rasmussen.
704 P.2d 599 (Utah 1985)] that the liquidated
damages must bear some reasonable relationship to
the actual damages - and that we carefully
scrutinize liquidated damage awards. . . "
In a recent case entitled Prudential Capital Group Co. v.
Mattson, et al.. 802 P.2d 104 (Utah App. 1990), the Court stated
the following:
11

. . . Provisions for liquidated damages have been
upheld the same as other terms in the contract,
except where the amount of liquidated damages
"bears no reasonable relationship to the actual
damages or is so grossly excessive as to be
entirely disproportionate to any possible loss that
might have been contemplated that it shocks the
12

conscience . . ." " (citations omitted)
Following the termination of the daily liquidated damage
assessment on June 13, 1986, there was a delay of some three
months before Young actually finished the project by completing
items of work which were identified during the final inspection
on July 21, 1986 and set out on a "punch list", which was
provided to Young on July 23, 1986 (exhibit 83). UDOT incurred a
total of $36,895.65 in engineering charges related to the
completion of the punch list items (page 2 of exhibit 64).
least one court has held a contractor liable

for liquidated

damages for failure to complete "punch list" items
the project was substantially completed.

At

even though

In the case of Sutter

Corp. v. Tri-Boro Authority. 487 A.2d 935 (Pa Super. 1985), the
contractor was held liable for 283.5 days at $200.00 per day for
failure to complete the punch list items.

In that case the court

said the following:
11

. . .We hold that the method of listing the
deficiencies (the punch list) did not require [a
finding] that the work was complete [at that
time] ."
The case has similarities to the instant case in that the owner
began using the plant at the time the punch list issued whereas
the highway Young built was also in use at the time the "punch
list" was issued.

The language in the liquidated damage

provision states that damages will be assessed for "any work that
shall remain uncompleted".

In the instant case the contract

specifies that damages apply "for each calendar day that any work
shall remain uncompleted after the contract time specified."
13

The

language is for all intents and purposes the same in each
contract. While it is true that# unlike the Tri-Boro case UDOT
chose not to impose liquidated damages from the time of the
issuance of the punch list, UDOT did incur damages.

UDOT has

obviously been careful and fair in its imposition of liquidated
damages.
B. The Delay in Completion of the Project was
Not the Fault of UDOT.
Other than the 43 day delay in completion of the project
caused by the materials site problem, there is no evidence that
UDOT in any way caused Young to be delayed in performing the
work.

The project required the importation of borrow material

to raise the grade of the roadway and the placement of paving.
The deadline for placement of paving was October 15. UDOT even
extended that deadline to accommodate Young.

October 15 was also

the date on which the contract specified all work should have
been completed.

With the 43 day extension of time the completion

date moved to November 27, 1985. Young completed the paving work
by October 25, 1985, but did not complete the placement of
signing until January 13, 1986. Under any scenario Young was
liable for liquidated damages beginning November 28, 1985 through
January 13, 1986, a total of 47 days.
On January 13, 1986 the major item of work that remained
incomplete was the placement and spreading of topsoil.

The

topsoil work had been subcontracted by Young to Sunbird
Development and

evidence shows Young delayed the commencement of

topsoil work either for its convenience and/or because of the
14

failure of Young to make timely payments to the subcontractor
(exhibits 42, 49, 50 and 52).

There was adequate time granted by

UDOT to accomplish said work within allowable time limits. This
fact is evident when you read the July 9, 1986 letter of Sunbird
Development to Young which letter details how their work of
hauling and placing topsoil was completed in 30 working days
(exhibit 52).

Rex Friant, Young's supervisor admitted as much

when he conceded that Nye "was very fair with us" in that he
granted 85 days of some 98 days requested in time extensions by
Young (tr. 109).

(Alan Young testified that there was no reason

the topsoil could not have been hauled and placed the fall of
1985.

(Pub. Depo. pp. 50-52 [see APP.])

The evidence further

shows that the topsoil was placed in piles and not spread at the
time of placement (tr. 108). The piles were later saturated as
the result of storms which then required that it be left in place
pending weather which would allow the topsoil to dry out (exhibit
52).

This is not the fault of UDOT. When the weather moderated

the resumption of operations was delayed as the result of payment
problems which again was not the fault nor responsibility of UDOT
(exhibits 42 and 52).
In summary, Young was in total control of the project
between November 28, 1985 and June 13, 1986 and determined the
time it would perform work or shut down the project all without
any control or interference by UDOT.

Young, not UDOT was

responsible for the delay and Reliance should not be rewarded by
being allowed to recover the liquidated damages which were
15

properly assessed.
C.

Appropriate Extensions of Time Were Granted by UDOT.

The contract is clear as to what is allowed in the way of
time extensions in the case of completion date contracts.
Essentially UDOT is allowed to grant additional time for added
work and for conditions "beyond the control or without the fault
of the contractor" (statement of fact no. 2 ) . Completion day
contracts do not allow for extensions of time related to normal
weather occurrences, or delays in delivery of materials or
supplies which might otherwise result in time extensions on a
working day contract (statement of fact no. 1).
UDOT accepted responsibility for the delay related to the
materials site and granted an extension of 43 days.

There was no

other event or condition which would justify a time extension
under terms of the contract.
The project is a federal aid project and time extensions
require approval of FHWA in order for UDOT to insure its right to
federal aid.

John Nye, the project engineer, conferred with an

FHWA official and secured approval for a waiver of time charges
totaling 42 days.

This was approved on the basis that there was

a period covering 42 days during the mid part of the winter when
no work occurred on the project.

(exhibit 82 and tr pp 233-240)

Said waiver was not required by any contract provision nor is it
specifically allowed by the contract, and is simply a good faith
concession.
The Chief Construction Engineer for UDOT, Bert Taylor,
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sought approval at a later time from FHWA for a further
concession as to the charging of time (exhibits 58 and 59).
FHWA declined Taylor's request.

The

Had UDOT elected to grant a

further concession it would have been at state expense (tr. 166).
The attitude of the FHWA is not unreasonable.

UDOT received

federal aid for engineering charges during the period of time
that Young was subject to the imposition of liquidated damages.
It would be unfair to the public at large who had already been
required to reimburse UDOT for costs approximating the amount of
the liquidated damages, as well as to other bidders who bid in
anticipation of meeting the contract completion date, for UDOT to
grant a further time concession (tr. 168-169).

Indeed, John Nye

stated that after conferring with FHWA at the time the 42-day
time extension was obtained that he concurred in the decision as
being fair (tr. 260-261).
The total time extension of 85 days is both fair and
reasonable considering the work which remained uncompleted on
October 15,1985.
D. Finding of Fact Number 30 is Supported by the
Evidence.
Reliance takes issue with Finding of Fact Number 30
regarding the adequacy of the evidence of "continuing overhead"
and goes to great length to examine specific statements made by
individual UDOT witnesses in an apparent effort to retry the
facts.

UDOT submits that there is ample evidence to support the

findings of the court.
Reliance represents in Point II, Number 3 of its brief
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that it has marshalled the evidence in support of Finding of Fact
number 30 and that it does not support the court's finding, but
it is clear that they have ignored evidence that supports the
court's finding.

Their attempt falls short of the standard set

by the court in a line of cases beginning with Scharf v. BMG
Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

The Court of Appeals in

the case of State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732 (Utah App. 1990) stated
the following:
The process of marshalling the evidence serves the important function of reminding litigants and appellate
courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder
at trial. . . . We believe that this deference is
appropriate and important in both civil and criminal
cases."
See also Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton. 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah
1987); State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); Reid v. Mutual
of Omaha. 776 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1989); Wright v. Westside
Nursery. 787 P.2d, 508, 513-514 (Utah App. 1990)
Reliance focuses on a statement made by the trial judge at
the time he rendered his decision and assumes that the statement
limits the court in its findings.

The trial judge stated the

following: "However, the court does feel that there is ample
evidence in the record indicating and supporting the notion that
some 65 or 70,000-1 can't recall the specific figures-of
continuing overhead costs . . . " were incurred by UDOT as being
reasonably related to the calculated amount of liquidated
damages.

(Bench Decision p. 12.)

In actual fact, the $65,000

amount covers the period between January and June of 1986, as
explained in Section I A of this brief, there was also additional
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evidence for the month of December 1985 totalling some $17#000
for a combined total in excess of $82,000 (exhibits 64 & 65).
The Court was well aware of this evidence by the time it entered
its judgment.

UDOT's counsel explained the relationship of the

two exhibits in its Post Trial Brief (R. 433-435) . It was also
pointed out in said brief that while there were no charges to the
project for over half the month of December 1985, state personnel
were on the project during the time that Young worked (R. at
434).

UDOT's counsel prepared a detailed factual finding with

both figures as well as additional detail following trial and the
rendering of the "bench decision".

(See Appendix.)

Counsel for

Reliance objected to the findings and conclusions in the format
which UDOT's counsel submitted them.

(R. at 460-469.)2

After

Reliance's objections were reviewed as well as the proposed
findings and conclusions, counsel for UDOT prepared Finding of
Fact number 30 (R. 480, ^ 30) which is admittedly general in
nature at the specific suggestion of the trial judge.

Reliance

apparently wants to ignore the costs which UDOT incurred in
December 1985 since it makes the disparity between the calculated
amount of liquidated damages and the actual damages greater.
Reliance hangs on the stipulated fact that the contract was
extended to January 8, 1986 and that UDOT is not allowed to
assert the December 1985 charges as part of the justification for
2

UDOT's proposed Findings and Conclusions of Law are not part
of the record for some unknown reason. The objections of Reliance
are of record and for that reason UDOT has set forth its Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the appendix for
reference along with Reliance's objections.
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the liquidated damages which were assessed.

While the contract

was ultimately extended 85 days which is the same as though it
were extended to January 8, 1986, the extension actually occurred
in two widely separated time periods as explained above.

The

first extension of 43 days was granted April 15, 1986 by letter
from John Nye to Young.
Reliance at that time.

The work was still being performed by
In that same letter Nye denied any

further extension (exhibit 47).

That means that it was November

27, 1985 when the project should have been completed and the
December 1985 engineering charges properly support the court's
finding.

The 42- day time concession was granted after all work

was complete.
Reliance argues that not all of the expenses set forth in
the exhibits which summarize charges made to the project
represent increased overhead.

They analyze the testimony of two

of UDOT's witnesses in great detail in an attempt to separate
"increased overhead" from the cost of activities which UDOT would
have incurred had the project been completed timely.

There may

well be some inconsistency between the actual charges and the
testimony of the UDOT witnesses as to what specific activities
crew members were involved in during the period between December
1985 and June 1986.

That is no doubt caused by the recollection

of the witnesses and the fact that the crew was administering two
projects at the same time.

However, the detailed exhibits which

list charges made to the project and which are summarized in
exhibits 64 and 65 clearly show two types of charges.
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One type

is time related and includes equipment rental, office expenses,
and various other expenses which occur with the passage of time.
Clearly this type of expense would be considered as increased or
extended overhead.

The other type of charge is related to

personnel and would be tied to activities which are normally
charged to a specific project depending on the individual
employees specific assignment.

These charges may or may not be

in the category of "increased overhead".

John Nye stated that

the salaries listed on page 1 of exhibit 64 for part of the month
of December 1985 actually involved 2 people.

One was the

inspector who was assigned to the project to monitor daily
activities, and one was John Nye himself (tr. 379). Nye
testified that he was on the project daily and devoted
considerable time to the project because it was over the allowed
time (tr. 383) . The charges for salaries listed on page 1 of
exhibit 64 thus qualify as either "increased" or "extended'
overhead; and to the extent that the salaries listed on page 2
cover said individuals, they would also represent extended
overhead.

The time devoted by these individuals would not have

been necessitated had the work been completed timely.
Nye testified that the late completion of the project
resulted in overtime and required spliting his crew between both
projects (tr. 372). No attempt was made to quantify overtime
charges to the other project which may have been caused by the
need to assign crew members to the project.

The increased cost

further justifies the liquidated damage assessment in this case.
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Reliance failed to deal with this evidence in its attempt at
marshalling the evidence.
The Court was not incorrect in finding that the evidence
supports the fact that UDOT incurred increased or "continuing"
overhead that justifies the imposition of the liquidated damages.
Reliance attempts to draw a distinction between "increased
overhead", the term used in section 108.08, and "continuing
overhead", the term used in Finding of Fact number 30. UDOT
submits that they are one and the same in the context of this
case.

The overhead was increased because it continued as a

result of Young's failure to complete the work timely.
The evidence supports the findings and conclusions of the
trial court.

Everything Reliance has alleged in its brief

concerning factual support for Finding of Fact number 30 was
submitted to the trial court and was rejected by the court.
II.

THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION DOES
NOT APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
A. The Terms of the Contract Require
All Work to be Completed by a Date
Certain in Order to Avoid the
Imposition of Liquidated Damages.

UDOT had many obvious reasons for specifying that the work
be completed by a date certain.

The most obvious reason was the

rising waters of the Great Salt Lake which in early 1985 were
threatening to inundate Interstate 1-80.

This was the third year

of a three-year record wet cycle. Another reason was the fact
that the work had to be accomplished while traffic was using the
highway.

By insisting on a completion date UDOT obviously hoped
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to limit danger to the motoring public from construction
activities (tr. 101-104).

Other reasons include economy in the

assignment of personnel to the project for inspection and
monitoring of the work.

This project was an emergency project

and had to be inserted into a schedule which included other
projects.
All of the claims and justification asserted by Young
during performance of the work in an effort to secure added time
would not support a time extension to a completion date contract
except for the error by UDOT in the clearance of the materials
site.

The contract specifications severely limit the engineer's

authority to extend completion day contracts (sections 108.06 and
108.07 of the standard specifications, exhibits 41 &42 and tr.
101) .
UDOT expected Young would plan the work such that the
completion date could be met.

In most completion date contracts

meticulous planning and scheduling are required as well as the
commitment of additional equipment and personnel to insure that
the date for completion is achieved.

Completion date contracts

are not extended unless the contractor performs additional work
or the engineer finds that the contractor was delayed because of
conditions "beyond the control and without the fault of the
contractor."

(Exhibit 4# Sections 108.06 and 108.07.)

The

evidence in this case shows that Young was delayed in achieving a
level of completion that would justify termination of time
charges because of normal winter weather, a failure to properly
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plan and schedule the placement of the topsoil, and problems
associated with the take over of Young by Reliance.

A large part

of the problem was related to payment by Young and/or Reliance to
the subcontractor employed to haul and place the topsoil. None
of these factors justify a time extension.
The contract specifies that the date set for completion is
the date on which "all work shall be completed."

No contractor

has a right to expect a waiver of liquidated damages when the
specified date for completion is exceeded because of its own
actions.
B.

Substantial Completion Does Not Apply
Because the Contract is a Completion Day
Contract and Does Not Contemplate
"Substantial Completion".

Reliance in Point I of its brief argues that the lower
court erred in ruling that "substantial completion does not apply
to the facts of this case", and that case law does not exist in
Utah to that effect, which ruling is set forth in conclusion of
law number 5. Reliance's argument mischaracterizes the Court's
ruling.

The ruling of the court does not reject the concept of

"substantial completion", it merely holds that it doesn't apply
to the facts of this case.
It is significant that Reliances' research was unable to
discover a Utah case which deals with the doctrine of substantial
completion and particularly one which addresses the issue of
timely performance.

The case of Stephens v. Doxey (198 P.2d 261

(Utah 1921) which Reliance alleges supports the doctrine of
substantial performance merely states a general rule of equity as
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it applies to an issue of the performance of a contract.

The

case involves a dispute between an owner and a contractor over
whether the job performance was complete.
did not meet the owners expectation.

Clearly the building

The owner was using the

building and the court merely held that the owner could not to
expect to escape the obligation to pay and that the contractor
would have to accept less than the full contract amount because
the evidence revealed that the job was not fully acceptable.
There was not a clearly defined contract or specifications by
which performance could be measured and the court recognized the
resultant difficulty.

The case has nothing to do with the issue

of substantial completion.

The case is best summarized by the

following quote by the court:
"This case, in many of its aspects, is a most
peculiar one, and presents many difficulties in
attempting to arrive at the legal rights of the
respective parties.
The court simply resorted to an equitable resolution of
the case.

The case is essentially an affirmation of the doctrine

of quantum meruit.

By contrast there is no need for an equitable

resolution in this case since the contract terms are clear.
The term "substantial completion" is sometimes defined in
contract specifications, most notably in the case of buildings
and structures that are to be occupied.

It is that point in the

construction when the building or structure can be safely
occupied and/or be used for its intended purpose while final
completion is still in the future.

Standard architectural

specifications usually provide that time charges will cease or be
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reduced at the point of "substantial completion".3

The standard

specifications applicable to the instant contract do not make
reference to substantial completion.

They do provide for

"partial suspension" which means that the project engineer can
reduce the daily time charge to a fraction of a day on a project
when work is suspended on some but not all items of work.
However the specifications state that "partial suspension may
apply to working or calendar day projects."
1.)

(Finding of Fact No.

Completion date contracts are not mentioned since they

provide that all work is to be completed by a specified date.

In

this instance "substantial completion" and "final completion" are
one and the same.
The standard specifications applicable to this contract in
section 108.08 specify that liquidated damages are for
"Departments increased overhead".

This is consistent with the

general concern that most owners have when they let a
construction contract.

One treatise states it this way:

"While avoidance of delays on a construction project
can increase the effective earnings of the contractor, timely
completion is principally a concern for the owner, since the use
and enjoyment of the project and revenues to be derived therefrom
are dependent on it." (Construction Law, Sec. 3.03 [1][a]
3

The Division of Facilities Construction and Management of
the State of Utah in their General Conditions applicable to
building construction define "substantial completion" as follows:
"Substantial Completion is the date certified by the Architect . .
. and generally means the date the Work . . . is sufficiently
complete in accordance with the Contract Documents so that the
Owner can occupy and utilize the Work for its intended use . ..."
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Matthew-Bender•)
In this case, the facts show that even though the contract
was completed to the degree that it was open to safe use of
traffic and that signs were in place as of January 13, 1986,
overhead charges continued to be charged to the contract until
September 1986. The charges include both personnel costs and
those which are simply related to time such as utilities and
equipment rental.

It was necessary to monitor the project, and

those items of work that occurred intermittently solely at the
whim of the contractor between January and June of 1986 when UDOT
terminated the charging of time.
UDOT recognizes that while no Utah cases deal specifically
with the issue of "substantial completion" that it is a valid
concept and may apply in cases which do not specify a completion
date, or which define how it is to be determined.

However

because of the specific language in the contract specifications
which govern completion day contracts UDOT submits that the
doctrine does not apply.

In other words the contract

contemplates that substantial completion and final completion are
one and the same.
The North Carolina Appellate Court construed a provision
similar to Section 108.08 in the case of Ledbetter Brothers. Inc.
v. North Carolina Department of Transportation. 314 S.E.2d 761
(NC App. 1984).

On the issue of "substantial completion" in a

contract where a completion date was specified similar to the
instant case the court held that the Department of Transportation
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had discretion as to when a contract is to be considered
complete.

The only restriction was that the Department had to

act in "good faith".

Neither in that case nor in this case is

there evidence of bad faith in the assessment of liquidated
damages.

The Court stated the following in commenting concerning

the purpose of liquidated damages:
11

. . .Aside from their compensatory function,
liquidated damages provisions have long been held
valid and consistent with public policy as an
appropriate means of inducing due performance
(citing Robinson v. U.S.. 261 U.S. 486, 43 S. Ct.
420 (1923). It would frustrate this policy, and
increase the likelihood of inconvenience and danger
to the public, to allow disputes, over substantial
performance to affect such provisions. The intent
of the damages provision is clear and its
application proper."
Reliance attempts to distinguish Ledbetter from the instant case
by indulging in speculation.

After pointing out that certain

facts cannot be discerned from the opinion in Ledbetter and after
listing certain criteria which Reliance believes supports its
position, it is stated that:
"It is possible that, using the criteria enumerated
above, the court in Ledbetter would have properly
concluded that the highway in that case was not
available for its intended use . . .".
It is of course possible, but it is more likely that the reverse
would be true. Most state highway specifications are patterned
after the AASHTO guide specifications and as a result are very
similar.

The Ledbetter decision illustrates how difficult it is

to apply traditional cases dealing with liquidated damages to
highway contracts. Unless a project is fully completed a highway
agency continues to suffer overhead costs.
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"Substantial

completion" doesn't usually terminate such costs as inspection
and monitoring and all the related costs of personnel and
equipment.

The North Carolina provision adds the cost to the

public along with its own overhead cost as an additional
justification for its daily assessment.

Other than the said

added cost justification, the North Carolina provision and the
Utah provision are essentially the same.

The Ledbetter decision

is therefore a good precedent for the situation in this case.4
See also Osceola County v. Bumble Bee Constr.. 479 So. 2d. 310
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) where liquidated damages were allowed
when a structure was not ready for use and damages were not
determinable at the time the contract was entered into.
UDOT respectfully submits that the terms of the contract
are clear and that the issue is not whether Young is entitled to
relief based on a theory of "substantial completion" but rather
when was the project complete, meaning final completion.

Final

completion in the context of a completion date contract could be
construed as 100% complete.
case that it was

It is clear from the facts of this

something less than 100% completion since that

did not occur until September 1986 when the punch list items were
finally complete, whereas time charges were suspended in June,
4

AASHTO is an organization of state highway and
transportation officials who assist the transportation industry
with research and technical assistance. Individual state agencies
use such guidance in the formulation of their contract provisions
which deal with liquidated damages as well as most other general
provisions. UDOT does not mean to imply that its specifications
dealing with liquidated damages are the same as North Carolina, but
they are similar and are variations of the AASHTO guide
specifications.
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finally complete, whereas time charges were suspended in June,
1986 when the topsoil and seeding were finally accomplished.
UDOT acted in good faith in its assessment of when the project
was to be considered as complete for the purpose of suspending
overtime charges.
Reliance argues that the largest portion of uncompleted
work was landscaping items "which did not impact the safety or
convenience of the public".
and without foundation.

That statement is absolutely untrue

Interstate 1-80 is a major freeway and

motorists using it expect to be free of the hazard posed by slow
moving construction traffic or construction activities which pose
a risk to high speed traffic.

Any delay in completion creates

more safety hazards to motorists, contractor personnel and UDOT
employees.

While it may be true that the dollar amount involved

with placing topsoil and seeding represents a small percentage of
the project cost, the impact on the general public and UDOT is
significant.

For that reason UDOT was justified in assessing

liquidated damages since such activities require close inspection
and monitoring to insure both contract compliance as well as
safety compliance.

There was simply no justifiable reason for

UDOT's engineer to terminate the charging of liquidated damages
until June 13, 1986 when the topsoil item was completed.

Except

for the period of 42 days in January and February 1986 during
which UDOT waived the assessment of time charges, the contractor
was engaged in various activities which required inspection and
monitoring.

The work involved with the topsoil took about 30
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days to accomplish in actual effort but it was spaced out from
October 1985 until June 1986. The engineer was certainly
justified in refusing to waive the assessment of the liquidated
damages since Young was responsible for the delay and the
resultant expense to UDOT.
Reliance argues that the highway was complete for all
intents and purposes and open to traffic and that it is improper
to assess liquidated damages.

One Court has ruled in a highway

case that an otherwise valid liquidated damage clause will
normally be enforced even though no actual damages were
sustained.

In that case the court allowed recovery of 52 days of

liquidated damages even though the highway was open on schedule
(see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. City of Chicago. 350 F.2d. 649 (7th
cir. 1965).
C. The Liquidated Damages Are Not a Penalty as
Alleged by Reliance, but UDOT Would Have
Suffered a Penalty had They Not Been
Assessed.
Reliance alleges that the liquidated damages imposed
pursuant to the contract result in a penalty.

In support of this

allegation Reliance argues that the project was substantially
completed, and that UDOT was not forced to assess "this $100,000
penalty."

Reliance alleges further that 99.9 percent of the

contract was performed and that this should excuse Reliance from
paying 100 percent of the liquidated damages.

In response, it

should be made clear that there is no $100,000 "penalty."
total amount of the liquidated damages is $93,600.

The

It is

inaccurate and in fact it is a misrepresentation for Reliance to
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suggest that the project was 99.9 percent complete during the
time the liquidated damages were accruing.

On June 13, 1986 when

the project was accepted as complete it was still less than 99.9
percent complete.

On July 21, 1986 when the punch list was

issued there was still work to be completed, even though the
assessment of liquidated damages was suspended.
The major item which was uncompleted on January 13, 1986
was the topsoil item.

It was significant enough in dollar amount

and the impact upon the safety of the motoring public posed by
its handling and placement that the project could not be
considered complete. When Young became liable for liquidated
damages beginning November 28, 1985, the project was 89 percent
complete according to UDOT's calculations. As late as May 17,
1986 when Young's subcontractor began hauling the topsoil the
percentage of completion was shown as 90% on UDOT's weekly
progress reports (exhibit 34, no. 55). Obviously Young did not
accomplish much work during the winter months of 1986 as
evidenced by the said weekly progress reports. What they did
accomplish was to keep some UDOT personnel and equipment captive
to the project.
UDOT's liquidated damage provision is not intended to
induce timely performance.

It is intended rather, to compensate

UDOT for its expense associated with the delay in performance.
It is therefore a valid provision and not a penalty.

Similar

provisions have been upheld for that reason (see Loggins Const.
Co. v. Stephen F. Austin University Board of Regents. 543 S.W. 2d
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Tex Civ. App. 1976

and S.L. Rowland Const. Co. v. Beall

Pipe & Tank Corp.. 540 P.2d 912 (Wash. App. 1975).
In response to Reliance's argument that UDOT was not
forced to assess "this $100,000 penalty", UDOT, in addition to
its objections to Reliance's characterization of liquidated
damages as a "penalty" and to the said amount as being an
exaggeration, simply refers to the contract provisions which in
UDOT's view do not allow relief to a contractor when the
completion date specified is not met.

The contract obligates

UDOT to assess the full time charge until the contract is
completed and accepted.

Section 108.06 of the Standard

Specifications does not authorize a partial suspension of the
daily time charge. It is in fact specifically provided that the
specified sum ($600) shall be assessed for each day beyond the
completion date that the project remains uncompleted (see Finding
of Fact No. 2 ) .
The trial court was absolutely correct in citing the case
of Ted R. Brown & Associates. Inc. Carnes Corp.. 753 P.2d 964
(Utah App. 1988) for the proposition that the Court should not
reform a contract simply because the terms appear harsh.

If the

contract is clear the parties should be left to the remedies of
the contract and should be entitled to enforce its terms. The
Court took this position in the case of Western Engineers. Inc.
v. State Road Commission. 437 P.2d 216 (Utah 1968) wherein the
contractor was denied relief for delay damages associated with
the time delay involved in revising plans because the contract
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contained a no damage for delay provision even though the delay
was upwards of a year.
Obviously the imposition of $93,600 in liquidated damages
is a significant amount and in the opinion of Reliance qualifies
as a "penalty".

By failing to enforce the contract terms UDOT

cannot be assured that it will receive federal aid reimbursement.
Certainly UDOT could decide on its own to waive or reduce the
daily charge for liquidated damages but in that event the FHWA
could justifiably refuse to concur in such concession.

This

would mean that UDOT would lose federal aid reimbursement on
whatever amount it elected to waive.5
in a penalty to UDOT.

That would clearly result

The trial court recognized the dilemma

such a waiver would pose to UDOT in its relationship with FHWA
and the need and necessity for UDOT to strictly enforce its
contract with Young according to its terms and as expected by
FHWA.

Strict enforcement is necessary to preserve the

relationship between UDOT and FHWA.

It is also necessary to keep

faith with other competing contractors who bid in the expectation
of meeting the completion date.
Reliance cites the case of S.L. Rowland Const. Co. v.
Beall Pipe and Tank Corporation. 540 P.2d 912 (Wash. App. 1975),
as authority for its contention that UDOT's liquidated damage
provision is a penalty provision.
5

There are significant

In fact, FHWA did not concur in the 43-day time extension
UDOT allowed for the error in clearing the materials site for usage
by Young. FHWA considered the failure to be the fault of UDOT and
declined to participate in the cost of moving the contractor or in
the allowance of added time. (Tr. 231-232.)
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distinctions between that case and this case.

In Rowland, the

owner sought to enforce the liquidated damage provision during
the period following the time when the pipeline was placed in
operation and the completion of the punch list work items. In
this case no damages were assessed after acceptance of the
project on June 13, 1986 and the completion of the punch list
items which occurred in September 1986, even though UDOT incurred
engineering costs totalling over $36,000 during that period.
UDOT's daily charge was approximately the same as its actual
costs during the time it was assessed unlike Rowland.
UDOT's liquidated damage provision does allow for a reduced
daily charge when some items of work are suspended.

It is called

partial suspension, but it only applies when contract time is
assessed based on working or calendar days.

To apply partial

suspension to a completion date contract would defeat the purpose
of specifying a completion date.
The question which should be the focus of the court's
concern is why did Young let the topsoil work, which took less
than 30 days of actual work time, drag on from October 1985 until
June 1986, a period of eight months?

Reliance acquired control

of Young during said time period and failed to make necessary
arrangements to expedite the work. It's a little late in the day
to secure concessions after UDOT incurred the added costs as a
result of disorganized and intermittent work efforts by Young and
Reliance.
UDOT acted responsibly by granting time concessions which
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reduced the amount of liquidated damages.

FHWA was not

unreasonable in its attitude concerning time extensions.

There

was a 42-day time extension granted based on the recognition that
no work occurred during the mid-winter of 1986. UDOT sought
additional relief by forwarding a letter from counsel for
Reliance to FHWA.

UDOT may have granted some added relief had

FHWA concurred. In the absence of such concurrence by FHWA UDOT
certainly has no duty to unilaterally grant a concession to
Reliance at its expense.
III. THE ABILITY TO ACCOUNT FOR ACTUAL COSTS
INCURRED FOR ENGINEERING AND
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS DOES NOT ELIMINATE
THE NEED FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
Reliance's arguments under Points II and III of its brief
appear to be at cross purposes.
Under Point II# Reliance argues that the liquidated
damages provision should not be upheld because UDOT's ". . .
'increased overhead'--was highly capable and easy to accurately
estimate at the time the contract was executed. . .".

This

argument is based on the fact that UDOT "records in great detail
its engineering charges, etc.". Reliance cites as authority for
this assertion the Restatement of Contracts. Section 339, and
specifically subparagraph 1 (b) which provides that a provision
for liquidated damages must fail unless:
(b) The harm that is caused by the breach is one that
is incapable or very difficult of accurate estimation.

UDOT

disagrees with this assertion by Reliance and alleges that just
because it records its actual engineering charges does not mean
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that it can automatically discern between those charges which
represent increased overhead and those which it would likely
incur in any event.

It certainly isn't feasible to do so in

advance of the occupance.

If this argument were correct it would

mean that anyone who kept accurate records of its expenditures
could not rely on a liquidated damage provision in a contract.
That clearly is not the intent of the Restatement of Contracts.
Whether a liquidated damage amount is reasonable or not is to be
considered in light of the facts known to the parties at the time
of contracting.

(See Wise v. U.S.. 249 U.S. 361 (1919);

Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. City of Chicago. 350 F.2d.649 (7th Cir.
1965); Southwest Engineering Co. v. U.S.. 341 F.2d. 998 (8th Cir.
1965) and P.T.&L. Const. Co. v. New Jersey D.O.T. (N.J. Ct. App.
1986) (unpublished opinion), in which no damage claim was ruled
enforceable despite 192 day delay, since sophisticated contractor
was knowledgeable about contract terms.)
The fact that a delay in completion results in a damage to
UDOT is clear enough.

The nature and extent of the damage is

what is not predictable.

The specified daily charge is based on

the dollar amount of the contract and represents a minimum
amount.

The project in question was approximately $9f000,000 and

it doesn't require much effort to justify the daily charge
specified considering the number of contract items and the
complexity of the project. According to one authority there is a
three-part test which Courts apply to determine whether a
liquidated damage provision is enforceable or whether it is a
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penalty.

The three questions are:

(1) Is the liquidated sum a

reasonable forecast of the damages likely to be sustained as a
result of the delay in performance?

(2)

Is the actual amount of

damages likely to be sustained difficult or impossible to
ascertain? and (3) Was the clause intended to compensate for
damages actually sustained, or is it intended to penalize the
breaching party? (Construction Lawf Stein, Matthew-Bender, Vol.
2, Par 6.10.

UDOT's liquidated damages provisions clearly meet

this test as explained herein.
The nature and extent of work remaining to be completed by
Young when the liquidated damage liability commenced in this case
was relatively straight forward and easy to calculate.

As is

evident from Reliance's argument under its 3rd point and its
retrial of the facts in its brief there is little agreement
between Reliance and UDOT as to what constitutes increased
overhead.

It should be obvious that the ability to determine

actual costs does not necessarily make the task of assigning
those costs as "increased overhead" or as overhead which would
occur regardless of timely completion an easy task.

As noted

earlier there is evidence that not all of the costs incurred by
UDOT applicable to this project were actually charged to the
project.

That is further justification for their use.

Reliance's allegations under point II of its brief to the
effect that UDOT is "making an example of Young" or that UDOT is
"punishing Young-decapitating Young, as it were, and placing its
head on a pole for all to see" is nothing but ridiculous and
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inflammatory rhetoric.

UDOT is obligated to enforce its

contracts if it expects to qualify for federal aid reimbursement.
It has a duty to other contractors who bid on the project to
enforce its contract terms. No one associated with UDOT was out
to "make an example" of Young or to "punish" Young.

In fact the

record shows a willingness on the part of UDOT to try and honor
the requests of both Young and Reliance to reduce the amount of
liquidated damages even beyond anything allowed by the contract.
The 42 day period wherein UDOT waived the liquidated damage
assessment with the concurrence of FHWA is a significant
concession.

Such action by UDOT clearly demonstrates that

Reliance is wrong to make such assertions.

Reliance should not

be heard to complain because UDOT elected to enforce the terms of
the contract when it as well as Young failed to make necessary
arrangements to complete the topsoil placement for several
months.
Even if Reliance's argument under point II of its brief to
the effect that UDOT's increased overhead "can be calculated with
great accuracy" is true# the evidence in this case shows actual
engineering charges between December 1985 and September 1986
totaling well in excess of the $93,600 assessment.

After

deducting a reasonable sum for costs and expenses that UDOT would
have incurred to wrap up the project had the project been
completed timely there are still

"increased" or "extended"

overhead costs which equal or exceed the assessment made by UDOT.
Under point III of its brief Reliance reverses its
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argument and seeks to challenge and discredit the charges made to
the project as being necessary even if the project were completed
timely.

This type of controversy and disagreement is exactly why

the use of liquidated damages is favored and frequently used.
Earlier in this brief we explained that the engineering
charges as summarized on exhibits 64 and 65 totaling in excess of
$82,000 both relate to the period of time when the liquidated
damages accrued.

There is also the crew overtime charged to the

other project and costs incurred for part of the month of
December which were not charged to this project which would help
to support and justify the liquidated damage assessment.
Reliance wants to discount some of the costs listed in exhibit 65
as being necessary to wrap up the project by asserting that they
would have been incurred regardless of the time the project was
completed.

Even if allowance is made for charges which would

relate to activities that occur in the wrap-up of any project,
the remaining actual charges attributable to the failure of Young
to complete the work on time still reasonably relate to the
amount assessed as liquidated damages.

It should be noted that

UDOT incurred an additional $36,000 of documented charges while
waiting for Reliance to complete the "punch list" items between
June and September, 1986. Reliance attempts by its argument to
depict UDOT as being in the wrong because it relies upon the
contract terms. This approach ignores the fact that Reliance has
no one to blame but itself and Young for the fact that it is
liable for liquidated damages in the first place.
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CONCLUSION

The decision of the Trial Court should be affirmed.
Liquidated damages are appropriate and justified by the evidence.
The doctrine of substantial completion has no application in this
case.

The contract provisions are clear as to the requirement

that all work was to have been complete as of the date specified
in the contract.

UDOT extended the contract completion date as

required and allowed by reason of the 43 day delay caused by
UDOT.

UDOT's damages in the form of extended and/or increased

overhead consisting of engineering and administrative costs bear
a reasonable relationship to the sum assessed as liquidated
damages.

The delay in completion is attributable to Reliance and

its assignor Young, both of which are knowledgeable entities who
understood the contract requirements related to the specified
completion date.

UDOT is obligated to enforce its contract terms

and in that connection is answerable to the public, to other
bidders and to FHWA# the agency which controls federal-aid
funding.

Finally, the evidence shows that UDOT extended the

contract a total of 85 days which according to Young's witnesses
was adequate time to complete the work and substantially equal to
the time extension requested.
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The Judgment of $1200.00 plus interest in favor of
Reliance and for costs in the amount of $163.00 to UDOT should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

day of March, 1992.
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